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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I take a broad look at a number of policy areas which have been 
especially impacted by the Internet and refer to this as the ‘e-policy’ domain. I then 
attempt to probe whether any insights from the so-called e-policy domain are relevant 
to the case of e-voting. In looking at some of the areas that have been most directly 
affected by the Internet I identify a tension between openness and closedness and 
draw attention to the important role of perceptions, especially those associated with 
technological risk. The conclusion drawn is that if these insights are relevant to the 
case of e-voting, then it is likely that future e-voting arrangements will exhibit 
significant cross-national variation. 
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I begin by taking a broad look at some of the policy areas that have been most 
impacted by the Internet and refer to this as the ‘e-policy’ domain. A disclaimer 
should be issued at this stage with regard to the e-policy domain: It does not represent 
a coherent whole but rather a serries of overlapping and myriad policy areas which 
have to some degree been affected by the explosion of the Internet. The overall aim, 
in any case, is not to try and define this admittedly amorphous policy domain, but 
rather to probe whether we can derive any insights from the e-policy context which 
may shed some light on pertinent issues related to e-voting. In looking at some of the 
areas that have been most directly affected by the internet we find that a lot of the 
problems that the internet raises are not so much new problems as old problems in 
new guises. Could this also be the case for e-voting?  
 
The core regulatory dilemmas that afflict the so-called e-policy domain could be 
succinctly illustrated by viewing the Internet through two conflicting lenses. On the 
one hand engineers view the Internet as an astonishingly elegant and seamless global 
information network that transcends national borders. This is indeed the case. 
Lawmakers and politicians, on the other hand, are confronted with a jurisdictional 
quandary with major regulatory fault lines emerging in areas such as taxation, 
applicable law, copyright and content, to name but a few. In the context of the e-
policy domain resolving these conflicts will require a delicate balancing between 
competing interests and, in many cases, authoritative political resolution. The internet 
technologies may favour speed and decentralisation politics, however, can be a slow 
and consensus seeking business characterised by an incredible sensitivity to particular 
issues. This dialectical tension between ‘architecture’ and ‘politics’ is at the core of 
the e-policy dilemma –we would expect the same to apply to the case of e-voting. 
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Intriguingly, when one applies a similar optic to e-voting a remarkable inversion of 
positions is evident. While politicians 1may trumpet, at least at the rhetorical level, the 
potential of e-voting for connecting with the electorate it has largely been the 
epistemic community formed by technologists and engineers that has expressed the 
gravest doubts as to the viability of internet voting.  We will return to this issue, 
which raises fundamental questions as to perceptions of risk among this very 
influential community, in greater detail below. 
 
There is thus at the heart of the internet public policy debate a tension between the 
possibilities offered by the technical architecture and the menu of political options 
available to policymakers2. The two are, of course, interacting.  This view differs, 
quite markedly, from the earlier literature concerning the Internet and its 
transformative potential which tended adopted a uni-causal lens whereby technology 
would eventually structure and determine political choices. At the risk of grossly 
simplifying some of the earlier literature two views were offered. The rosier vision 
envisaged the emergence of an E-topia. As we moved away from the ‘atom’ society to 
the ‘bit’ (i.e. digital society) the structure of society, the economy and current forms 
of political organization would be transformed3. An alternative but dystopian future 
was offered by others for whom the internet threatened to unleash unstoppable 
technical forces, such as cyber terrorism, which would mark the demise of state 
power4. While the respective prognoses may have differed they both shared a similar 
                                                 
1 See for instance the chairman of the British Cabinet’s e-democracy committee, Robin Cook, interview 
with The Guardian ‘Cook plans to make UK first to vote on internet’ by  Jackie Ashley, 7 January 2002 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/internetnews/story/0,7369,628776,00.html 
2 One of the most sophisticated analysis of this interaction is offered by Lessig’s seminal work, see in 
particular Lessig 1999. Code and other laws of cyberspace . New York: Basic Books;.  
3 This view is offered by Negroponte, Nicholas. Being Digital. New York: Knopf; 1995. 
4 See for instance Angell, Ian ‘The Real Politik of the Information Age’ Information Strategy, January 
1998  
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techno-deterministic diagnosis. Over the past years somewhat of a reversal has been 
evident as some of the earlier hyperbolic statements have given way to a more sober 
assessment. In this vein it is not surprising that two eminent international relations 
scholars, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, would be among those to challenge, at the 
height of the internet and e-commerce boom, the wisdom of such earlier 
prognostications especially those that concerned the demise of the nation-state5. They 
ascribed a primacy to the inherent adaptability of the nation-state, which could among 
other things seek greater international co-ordination in the context of a digitally 
injected version of globalization. This is indeed happening with greater international 
co-ordination visible –usually via international treaties - in such diverse areas as 
protection of intellectual property rights, data protection regimes and even in the case 
of cybercrime. The problem with some of the earlier cyber fantasies is that they parted 
from the misguided assumption that the virtual world was somehow independent from 
the real world. It is not and this may have profound implications, especially for the 
case of e-voting.  
 
Recent scholarship on the internet and its public policy implications has revealed that 
many of the fundamental policy issues that are raised are not so much new problems 
as old ones that appear in new guises6. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the 
argument, which may be relevant to the case of e-voting. In the domain of data 
protection there has long been a tradition of regulation in the privacy sphere. The first 
wave of reform in most western legal systems emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
                                                 
5 Keohane, Robert and Nye Joseph S. Power and Interdependence in the Information Age. Foreign 
Affairs. 1998; Volume 77(5). 
6 See for instance Cohen, Stephen and Delong Bradford and Zysman John. Tools for Thought: What is 
new about the 'E-conomy'. Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. 2000(Working Papers 
138). Also see Zysman, John and Weber Steven. Governance and Politics of the Internet Economy- 
Historical Transformation or Ordinary Politics with a New Vocabulary? Berkeley Roundtable on the 
International Economy . 2000 May (Working Paper 141).  
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legislation was a reaction to the new challenges to privacy caused by expanded 
possibilities for collecting, storing and transmitting data by new technologies. Data 
protection laws were enacted and have been constantly revised updated and aimed at 
protecting the citizens' right to privacy. Seen from this light the privacy question is 
not a new one, although the Internet does accentuates an old policy problem that has 
pitted civil liberties groups against government for decades. Nonetheless there have 
been shifts that alter the fundamental nature of the problem. The old policy problem 
concerned steps to prevent government abuses but in the recent years the private 
enterprise has increasingly replaced national government as the largest potential threat 
to personal data abuse. A difficult balance between the privacy interests of the data 
subjects and the freedom of the holders of personal data has to be struck. In the case 
of e-voting serious privacy questions are raised, especially where private parties are 
involved in the electoral process. 
 
Another policy area that has been significantly impacted by the internet is intellectual 
property rights. Although intellectual property issues have been a significant subject 
of law for many years (the origins of current international efforts to address 
intellectual property protection dating back to the Paris and Berne Convention’s of the 
late 19th century) the Internet today plays the dominant role in the illegal distribution 
of software and other protected products. Users are able to use all kinds of online 
communication facilities, e-mail or bulletin boards, to facilitate the downloading of 
copyright protected material. At the heart of the challenge is the massive discrepancy 
between the costs of producing a work, program etc and the negligible cost of 
reproduction. This explains the vigorous demand on the part of rightholders for 
protective regimes, with two of the most salient copyright products, from a cyber 
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perspective, being software and music. Another example that illustrates the notion of 
an old problem in a new guise is in relation to dealing with illegal and harmful content 
on the internet. There has long been a tradition of regulating the content of new media 
with legislators, by and large, succeeding in imposing some forms of restrictions on 
content that they perceive to be harmful. At certain historical junctures, which usually 
coincide with the emergence of a new media form, issues related to censorship and 
content regulation can literally explode into the public domain and generate moral 
panic. In this respect the heated debate concerning pornography and other ‘harmful’ 
material freely available on the Internet, follows a classic pattern of moral panic 
throughout the ages. A succession of new media, the novel, the cinema, television, 
video, computer games have all generated recurrent waves of public anxiety, 
especially during the early stages of their introduction.  
 
The point of this policy detour is to underline the argument that e-voting is likely to 
raise age old issues in new guises.  Transformative e-voting arrangements, such as 
new platforms facilitating an unprecedented degree of deliberation or participation 
possibilities, raise issues that hark back to Athenian democracy. Who would be the 
potential winners or losers from such new voting arrangements and what are the 
normative implications of promoting different models of democracy, e.g. participatory 
versus more deliberative models. Some potential insights to these questions can 
certainly be gleaned from the e-policy domain. Just as lessons from the e-commerce 
domain have taught us that the internet cannot alter the fundamental economic laws of 
demand and supply one ought not to expect e-voting to provide a digital panacea7 for 
                                                 
7 For a skeptical account see Norris, P (2002) ‘E-voting as the Magic Ballot? The impact of internet 
voting on turnout in European Parliamentary elections’ Paper presented for the conference on E-voting 
and the European Parliamentary elections, held at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies in 
Florence, May 10 and 11, 2002. 
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the purported crisis that is commonly said to afflict modern democracies. 
Notwithstanding these disclaimers it is possible that e-voting, assuming it goes further 
than merely improving voting convenience, could provide for some real innovations. 
 
Thus far we have emphasized the rather intuitive notion that e-voting, however novel, 
will tend to raise old issues as has been the case in other e-policy areas. Let us now try 
to unpick this notion of the e-policy domain somewhat further. That the Internet poses 
a challenge for policymakers is now old news and is well documented by a multitude 
of studies. What is revealing, however, is the nature of this challenge. On the one the 
Internet is seen as a vital tool for enhancing competitiveness. This calls for ‘enabling’ 
type policy initiatives to establish favorable regulatory environments that are 
conducive to innovation and commerce. Examples include e-commerce initiatives 
and, more pertinent for the case of e-voting, the so-called e-government strategies that 
are being pursued by most advanced industrial nations.  On the other hand the Internet 
also poses a series of negative challenges. Whether it is in the form of facilitating 
cyber attacks on critical infrastructures or disseminating child pornography the 
Internet is seen as a threat to certain aspects of the established order. These include 
the aforementioned examples of data protection, copyright rules and dealing with the 
dissemination of illegal and harmful content. Thus, when surveying the e-policy 
terrain one can distinguish between proactive policies that aim to channel the positive 
and enabling aspects associated with the Internet and another set of policies that 
attempt to address the negative fallout. Clearly the case of e-voting falls within the 
more enabling and proactive strategies. But this would be a very partial account –we 
have to dig deeper in order to gain a more complete understanding of the issues at 
                                                                                                                                            
paper 
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stake. Let us take e-government as an example of the tension that is at the core of the 
e-policy dilemma. To aid us in the conceptualization we could imagine a continuum 
ranging from a very open e-government model at one end of the spectrum to a more 
closed model at the other end. At the open end of the continuum citizens may be able 
to interact with government in a way that goes further than say, merely filling online 
tax receipts, but offers real possibilities for greater democratic deliberation and 
participation in decision-making processes. At the closed end of the continuum e-
government consists of a leaner and more efficient internal public administration 
model with only limited scope for democratic interaction between government and 
citizen. Let us refer to this, for want of a better label at this stage, as the tension 
between openness and closedness.  One of our core assumptions is that this 
problematique, between the open and the closed, permeates most of the policy debates 
concerning the Internet. Could this be the same for e-voting? The tension is manifest 
whether one focuses on copyright (fair use versus strong copyright rules); online 
privacy (voluntary codes of conduct for data controllers versus strong data protection 
regulatory regimes); software (open source code versus proprietary software); 
computer security (; taxation (tax moratorium on internet transactions versus 
taxation); illegal and harmful content (user empowering filtering technologies versus 
top-down censorship); e-government (openness in terms of encouraging citizen to 
government communication and more closed versions to improve the internal 
efficiency of public administration). Could e-voting arrangements be characterized by 
a similar tension between open models and others that  are more closed? One could 
distinguish between different models of e-voting from the more closed systems where 
voting takes place in controlled environments such as public voting kiosks to more 
open systems that allow for remote voting from the home. 
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 The internet in this respect raises some thorny issues as to what constitutes an 
appropriate mix between the open and closed. In some cases old policy bargains will 
be challenged, as has occurred with regard to online taxation and copyright laws. 
Sometimes the market will decide the appropriate mix between openess and 
closedness as in the case of computer software. In others it will becomes a public 
policy question that requires authoritative political resolution from lawmakers. In the 
case of e-voting a political decision will be required, firstly to decide whether or not 
to offer the possibility and secondly to decide the appropriate mix between the open 
and the closed –e.g. between full-scale internet voting from the home and a more 
limited version, say at controlled kiosks. The key point is that the appropriate mix is 
not necessarily a neutral, or for that matter even a technological question. It will 
depend, as it does in other e-policy areas, on many factors such as political cultures, 
policy styles and crucially –given the serious security concerns that are raised- on 
perceptions of risk. classic examples from the e-policy domain concerns the 
transatlantic divergence on the issue of online privacy where the EU and the US have 
opted for different regulatory regimes for the protection of personal data. Are there 
any lessons to be drawn for e-voting? The most obvious, if the e-policy context is 
anything to go by, would be to expect cross-national variations in potential e-voting 
arrangements8. This would be the result of not only differences in policy styles, 
traditions of democracy and constitutional factors but also, crucially, as a result of 
differences between perceptions of risk. The latter could profoundly influence the 
type of e-voting arrangement that is sought and subsequently implemented.  While the 
                                                 
8 Variations could exist with states as well, in the local elections of May 2nd in Britain no less than 31 
separate trials of innovative voting methods –mostly of an electronic nature- are taking place among 
the most innovative are arrangements to allow voting via mobile phones. 
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constitutional factors have been considered elsewhere 9 the role of risk perception has 
–to my knowledge- not yet been adequately studied.   
 
By focusing on the notion of risk perception, or more specifically perceptions of 
technological risk, it is hoped that some further insights may be gained for the case of 
e-voting. In spite of the fact that the first binding political elections that allowed 
voters to cast their ballots via internet –the 2000 Arizona Democratic Presidential 
Primary- took place in the US most studies and reports conducted in the US have been 
lukewarm at best. Moreover, one of the most influential of these, a report from the US 
National Science Foundation 10, is patently skeptical about the idea. The risks –
according to this particular community of researchers- are far too great at this early 
stage and the technology is still too uncertain. But will task forces from other nations 
necessarily reach the same conclusions? Just because an eminent US institution has 
given internet voting the ‘thumbs down’ does not mean that other task forces will 
reach the same conclusions –although to date this has arguably been the case. To shed 
some more light on this it will be necessary to try and unravel the notion of 
technological risk perception somewhat further.  This is especially relevant for e-
voting given the fact that the risk and uncertainty dimension are at centre of most 
debates. 
 
Science and technology studies have in recent decades made progress on revealing the 
socially constructed nature of risk perception. Even societies that are similar in 
                                                 
9 A. Auer and A. H. Trechsel (eds) (2001) Voter par Internet? Le projet e-voting dans le canton de 
Genève dans une perspective socio-politique et juridique, Geneva, Basle, Munich: Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn. Available at  
http://www.ge.ch/chancellerie/egovernment/doc/Voter_par_Internet.pdf
10 See for instance Internet Policy Institute (2001) Report of the National Workshop on Internet Voting, 
www.nsf.gov; also see the California Internet Voting Task Force (2000) A Report on the Feasibility of 
Internet Voting PDF available at www.ss.ca.gov  
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economic, social and political structures can produce radically diverging 
conceptualizations and management of risk. Moreover, particularly acute differences 
–in risk perceptions- are likely to arise when the risk in question touches upon issues 
that are deemed basic to a societies conception of itself. Could the same be true for e-
voting? One of the major puzzles for comparative policy researchers investigating risk 
regulation is to explain how even given a common base of scientific understanding 
national variations in risk management persist. A couple of examples of transatlantic 
divergences on areas such as the environment and biotechnology are illustrative of the 
phenomenon. With regard to biotechnology very different attitudes exist on either side 
of the Atlantic in relation to the acceptability of genetically modified organisms 
(GMO’s) even when based on similar scientific evidence.11. With regard to the 
environment striking differences have also been reflected in the policies of the US and 
the EU with the latter opting for a ‘precautionary principle’. Interestingly, what is 
deemed acceptable evidence in one national policy context is not necessarily given the 
same weight in another. In other words, differences in the kinds of evidence that a 
government and the public in general are willing to accept as a basis for policy 
decisions exhibit marked divergences as do standards of proof and persuasion. Could 
such insights from comparative policy research apply to e-voting? That is could 
differences in the tolerance and perception of technological risk influence e-voting 
arrangements in terms of the mix between the degree of openness and closedness or 
the extent to which proposals are actually prioritized by the policy agenda? 
 
In seeking to explain differences in science and technological risk perceptions 
scholars have pointed to the role of framing. The crux of the matter is that framing –
                                                 
11 See Vogel, David. Ships Passing in the Night: The changing politics of risk regulation in Europe and 
the United States. EUI Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre. 2001(RSC No. 2001/16). 
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especially when it refers to risk- far from being a neutral statement appears to be the 
product of deeply engrained cultural belief systems. An example from the so-called e-
policy domain can elucidate this phenomenon of ‘framing’ within a cyber context –
and may be pertinent for e-voting. Modern advanced societies increasingly rely on the 
supply and distribution of certain goods and services, such as water, electricity and 
telecommunications which are increasingly being tied together by computer networks. 
There is concern that this reliance on computers and computer networks makes 
nation’s ‘critical information infrastructures’ vulnerable to ‘cyber’ attacks. During the 
nineties the debate in the US concerning critical information infrastructures was 
couched in terms of a militarist and national security discourse that warned of the 
potential dangers of an ‘electronic Pearl Harbor’ and used concepts such as cyberwar 
and ‘information warfare’.  The terminology was politically and normatively loaded 
in favour of a national security approach –with the accompanying advantages that this 
offered in terms of less public scrutiny and a greater scope for secrecy12. The EU on 
the other hand has opted for a more ‘civilian’ type discourse –no doubt due to its lack 
of competencies in the security domain. Recent European Commission documents on 
network and information security13 refer to a market failure in the provision of 
security –most critical infrastructures are owned by the private sector- which makes 
regulation more palatable.  In sum, framing matters. Risks that are acceptable in one 
social context may be politically more sensitive in others, and it certainly affects the 
range of policy options considered by policy-makers.  
 
                                                 
12 A similar debate has been raging in the US in relation to the recently signed USA Patriot Act 
(October 2001) 
13 See especially the European Commission’s Communication on Network and Information Security: 
Proposal for a European approach.  COM(2001)0298. 
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One of the big questions in e-voting research is therefore to address how e-voting is 
being framed in different national contexts?  Are there noticeable differences in 
relation to the degree to which the risk dimension is emphasized or de-emphasized?  
In spite of a common corpus of scientific and technological knowledge it would not 
be startling to expect cross-national variations in relation to the tolerance of risk and 
uncertainty associated with e-voting. Comparative policy research provides countless 
examples to this effect in other ‘e’ policy areas.-  Thus, in addition to the more 
obvious factors that may influence e-voting arrangements such as differences in 
political culture, traditions of democracy and constitutional provisions, divergences in 
perceptions of technological risk among social groups could also be an important 
factor in explaining future differences in outcomes. 
 
To summarize, this admittedly very brief survey of the e-policy terrain has identified a 
series of themes that may be pertinent to the e-vote debate: 
 
• The dialectical tension between ‘architecture’ and ‘politics’ and the notion that 
many of the issues that are raised by e-voting, just as they are in some of the 
other e-policy domains, are not necessarily new but rather old issues in new 
guises.  
• The inherent tension between opting between open and closed models and the 
idea that the appropriate mix between the two will be determined by cultural, 
political and constitutional factors as much as by science and technology.  
• A corollary of the former is that we would therefore expect cross national 
variations in the mix leading to potential variations in e-voting arrangements.  
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• Finally I have drawn attention to the issue of ‘framing’ and the notion that 
perceptions of technological risk may vary. Even though we are at an 
embryonic stage –a key policy community in the US has expressed grave 
doubts –more comparative research would be required to properly asses its 
implications for e-voting arrangements in different political contexts. 
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